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I. Introduction

Consumers finance corporations, and corporations finance consumers. A long literature explores many dimensions of the former, but it is
not clear how much of this analysis applies
to the latter. The magnitudes are reversed; instead of the hundreds of millions of consumers
choosing among thousands of corporations, we
have thousands of corporations choosing among
hundreds of millions of consumers. The idea that
consumers invest as if they know approximately
what there is to know about corporations seems
unlikely to apply so well in the other direction.
The credit bureaus that have emerged to gather
and sell consumer-specific information face both
the difficulty of gathering the relevant facts and
federal limits on what they can sell. These limits
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Institutions Center and research assistance from Lily Fang,
Nadia Masri, Dan Mingelgrin, and Adriana Riviere-Badell are
gratefully acknowledged. Contact the author at musto@wharton.
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Federal law mandates
the removal of personal
bankruptcies from
credit reports after 10
years. The removal’s
effect is market efficiency in reverse. The
short-term effect is a
spurious boost in apparent creditworthiness,
especially for the more
creditworthy bankrupts,
delivering a substantial
increase in both credit
scores and the number
and aggregate limit of
bank cards. The longerterm effect is lower
scores and higher delinquency than initial
full-information scores
predict. These findings
relate to both the debate
over the bankruptcy
code and the wisdom of
influencing market
clearing by removing
information.
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are attempts to influence the clearing of the consumer-credit market,
and it is an open empirical question what they actually accomplish.
This article considers one of the intuitively most-important limits, the
10-year limit on reporting personal bankruptcy, analyzing its immediate effect on credit access and its longer-run effect on creditworthiness. The findings relate to both the debate over the bankruptcy
code and the wisdom of influencing market clearing by removing
information.
One way to describe this study is as a test for market efficiency in
reverse. When a market adds new information about an issuer, there is a
short-run effect on the clearing price and quantity of its securities, and a
long-run effect that this change in its financing opportunity set has on its
operations, presumably in the direction of economic efficiency. Were
the market to subtract information, there would be a short-run effect on
clearing and a longer-run effect, but this time away from informational
and economic efficiency. To the extent that consumer creditors rely on
credit bureaus for information, the reporting limit subtracts adverse
information from the market, implying both a spurious short-term boost
to apparent creditworthiness, and whatever credit access that brings,
and the longer-term effect on the consumer’s behavior of getting this
access. Alternatively, if lenders have other means of gaining the information represented by the bankruptcy information, removing the flag
should have little effect. Therefore, the results bear on the informational
efficiency of the consumer credit market, the efficacy of regulating this
market with reporting limits, and the quality of postbankruptcy credit
access, which in turn bears on the incentive to file in the first place.
What makes the analysis feasible is a pair of panel databases of
credit reports from one of the major credit bureaus, Experian. One
tracks 44,000 consumers with indicators of past Chapter 7 bankruptcies filings, that is, ‘‘bankruptcy flags,’’ on their July 1994 (7/94)
credit reports, over nine dates: quarterly from 7/94 to 4/96, and 9/97. It
also covers 20,000 consumers without bankruptcy flags on 7/94. The
other tracks 100,000 randomly sampled consumers monthly from 3/97
to 3/00, and it provides some demographic information. Each report
contains hundreds of statistics on credit availability and usage, so the
opportunity to analyze consumer credit dynamics, particularly as they
relate to Chapter 7, is substantial.
The data cover a variety of credit types, but the analysis focuses on
bank-card credit, for three reasons. First, bank-card credit is generally
unsecured, and the major part of unsecured consumer credit, so it is the
major market affected by creditworthiness issues. Second, the industry’s intense solicitation is a fast link between potential and actual
bank-card access. A consumer whose credit report changes in a way
that frees up bank-card credit will soon have it, and his credit report
will soon show it. By contrast, credit relationships such as car loans
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reflect credit-report changes only when the consumer actively shops
for them. And, finally, the typical bank-card lender originates millions of small loans, which implies a dependence on credit bureaus
and therefore exposure to the information limits imposed on credit
bureaus.
Measuring the short-term boost is easy because both panels track a
group of filers past the moment when their flags disappear. By comparing a consumer with a flag to that person a year later, without a flag,
we observe the effect of just the flag and the passage of a year, controlling for personal circumstances, including those that precipitated the filing. That is, the flag’s departure, unlike its arrival, reflects a
preset legal schedule and so is exogenous to the consumer’s circumstances. To control for the passage of a year, so as to focus more
precisely on the effect of the flag’s removal, the same year-later
comparison is conducted on past filers who do not lose their flags, so
that the removal’s short-term effect is apparent in the difference between the first group and the others. Measuring the long-term effect is
constrained by the data to a couple years, as both panels track only a
few filers past 12 years post-filing. What we can do is follow a group
of filers from their initial state with bankruptcy flags to the end of
the data and ask how their creditworthiness at the end compares to
their creditworthiness at the beginning.
The results on the short-term effect show a strong effect for the most
creditworthy past filers. Those whose credit scores before the flag
removal put them in the fortieth to fiftieth percentiles of the general
population, high for a past filer, experience a leap in credit scores past
19% of the general population, on average, and an $1800 average lift
in bank-card credit limits. The effect shrinks as the cum-flag credit
score declines. These figures demonstrate the significance of creditbureau information to the bank-card industry, and of regulating this
information, by showing that the regulation delivers significant credit
access that was not available under full information. They also document an additional cost of filing bankruptcy, beyond the one-time
offset of some assets against some debts documented previously. That
is, consumers deciding whether to file bankruptcy are generally in bad
circumstances, so they can expect weak future credit access whether or
not they file. What the results here show is that, conditional on a
consumer’s circumstances, a bankruptcy flag has an additional limiting
effect, implying an additional utility loss.
The big picture for the longer term is that creditworthiness declines.
Ex-flag scores are lower, and debt and delinquency higher, than cumflag scores predict. That is, the net effect of the removal of bankruptcy
information is that the past filers become riskier, as measured by
scores, borrowing, and delinquency, than other consumers with the
same initial scores, borrowing, and delinquency. There is also some
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evidence that this effect is stronger in states with higher exemptions,
consistent with the ‘‘strategic’’ model of consumer creditworthiness
supported by Fay, Hurst, and White (2002). Chapter 7 is filed about a
million times a year,1 so the implication of these results is a large-scale
distortion of credit access and increase in household financial risk.
The rest of the article is in five sections. Section II summarizes the
relevant legislation and literature, Section III describes the data, Section IV measures the short-term effect, Section V measures the longerterm effect, and Section VI summarizes and concludes the article.
II. Background
A. Relevant Legislation and Industrial Organization

Two areas of legislation are relevant to the study of consumer credit
after bankruptcy. Several aspects of personal-bankruptcy law have
potentially important implications for postbankruptcy consumers and
their creditors, as do some of the restrictions placed on credit bureaus.
This section covers each briefly and discusses the adaptation of bankcard issuers to their legal environment.
Chapter 7 discharges existing debts, except those that cannot be
discharged (e.g., student loans) and those that consumers reaffirm (e.g.,
car loans, so they can keep the cars). The discharge permanently enjoins
the affected creditors from trying in any way to collect. In exchange, the
consumer forfeits assets that exceed statutory exemptions, which vary
by state. The alternative procedure is Chapter 13, where there is no
forfeit or immediate discharge but instead a partial repayment on a 3–
5 year schedule followed (if completed) by a discharge of the remainder.2 This study focuses on Chapter 7 because it is the more common
choice (about 70% of personal filings) and because the discharge
simplifies the relation between the filing and future credit access. With
the affected debt no longer outstanding, the subsequent importance of
the filing to potential creditors is simply through the fact that it occurred,
and when it occurred. Apart from the removal of bankruptcy information, there is no particular significance to the postbankruptcy year.
The legal schedule aside, more time since filing is intuitively better news about a consumer, in that it indicates distance from the
circumstances that precipitated filing. Empirical research identifies
medical expenditures and debt as strongly related to the filing decision (Sullivan 1968; Stanley and Girth 1971; Sullivan, Warren, and
1. According to a May 16, 2002, news release by the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts, there were 1,036,410 nonbusiness Chapter 7 filings in the year that ended March 31,
2002.
2. For a detailed description of the different bankruptcy options, see Bankruptcy basics,
available at www.uscourts.gov/publications.html.
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Westbrook 1989; and Domowitz and Sartain 1999), and since the
underlying medical problem is fatal in some cases and cured in others,
it is likely that its lingering influence on survivors declines over time.
The influence of other bankruptcy-related events, such as job loss,
business failure, or divorce, also decline. So an upward trend in credit
access after bankruptcy makes sense from this perspective.
There is the potential for a countervailing force, however, in the law
on repeat discharges. A filer is ineligible for a subsequent discharge
until 6 years after a previous discharge; the discharge is the final event
of the bankruptcy proceeding, so this means the filer cannot complete
a second Chapter 7 filing until 6 years after completing the first.
Therefore, recent Chapter 7 filers are different from the rest of the
population in their delayed access to Chapter 7 as an escape from debt
obligations. During the delay, impaired creditors may be able to garnishee wages or otherwise seize value, which means that the 6 year
rule may boost the filer’s creditworthiness, where this boost would
decline to zero by 6 years. It would intuitively bottom out well before
6 years, since consumers’ unsecured credit is generally bank cards,
and the default-risk difference between a bank-card holder who can
file in a few years and one who can file right away appears small. The
one who can file in a few years could wait a while, charge his or her
limit, maybe make a few minimum payments, and then file. So the
likely path of creditworthiness after filing, given that the filing and its
date are observable, is the sum of two trends: an upward trend due to
generally changing circumstances and a downward trend that flattens
some time before 6 years, due to the repeat-discharge law.
The law that governs whether the filing and its date are observable is
the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). Ten years after the date of adjudication of bankruptcy, the date shortly after filing when the court
decrees that the filer is bankrupt, the FCRA requires credit bureaus to
exclude the filing from reports ( FCRA sec. 605(a)(1)). So the moment
that the credit bureau carries out this order, the report that potential
creditors can observe loses all reference to the filing. The moratorium
for all other adverse items is 7 years (FCRA sec. 605(a)(2–6)), so all
derogatory information about a filer’s prepetition debt is gone by 7 years
postpetition. Neither this nor any other law obliges creditors not to
condition on bankruptcies more than 10 years before or other delinquencies more than 7 years before; the obligation is only for ‘‘consumer
reporting agencies’’ not to report this information to third parties.3

3. For example, it would appear to be legal for an issuer to deny credit on the basis of a
12-year-old bankruptcy it had observed and recorded itself because one of its cards was
involved. This would further appear to encourage issuers to merge, so as to condition their
credit granting on more internal data, although conceivably the FCRA could apply to data
acquired this way.
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In addition to restricting what credit reports contain, the FCRA also
restricts the scenarios under which they may be furnished. The scenario important to the bank-card industry, the one responsible for the
3 billion per year ‘‘pre-approved’’ solicitations,4 is FCRA section
604(c)(1)(B), allowing bureaus to furnish reports ‘‘in connection with
any credit or insurance transaction that is not initiated by the consumer,’’ provided that ‘‘the transaction consists of a firm offer of credit
or insurance,’’ and also that the consumer has not expressly prohibited
bureaus from doing this. A ‘‘firm offer of credit or insurance’’ is
defined in FCRA section 603(l) as one where the consumer must be
offered credit if the report meets ‘‘specific criteria’’ and if the information the consumer sends back to the creditor meets some additional
limited standards. In this way, bank-card issuers actively seek out
consumers with attractive credit reports, quickly bringing the consumers’ bank-card access to their attention.
Credit reports show creditors a long list of statistics relating to
credit use. Creditors are free to process these statistics as they see fit,
but they can also refer to commercially provided credit scores. Credit
scores map credit reports to scalar estimates of creditworthiness, and
while several scores are available, the FICO score of Fair Isaac and
Company is by far the most widely referenced. Over 75% of mortgage
loans use FICO scores,5 corporate credit-rating agencies characterize
the risk of consumer receivables in securitizations by reference to
FICO scores,6 and underwriting standards often refer explicitly to
FICO scores.7 So the FICO score is not only a respected estimate of a
credit report’s implied creditworthiness, it is the implied creditworthiness for some purposes.
B. Relevant Literature

With its exploration of credit access after Chapter 7, this study contributes to the growing literature on personal bankruptcy. The theoretical literature observes that the bankruptcy code balances the benefit
of insuring against expensive misfortunes against the cost of facilitating
creditor abuse (e.g., Rea 1984; Dye 1986; and Athreya 2001). One goal
4. ‘‘Banks expand card marketing and credit extension while seeking to restrict consumer
access to bankruptcy,’’ Consumer Federation of America July 8, 1998, press release. Note
that this is about one card every 12 days for the average household.
5. ‘‘Borrower’s rate may hinge on credit score,’’ Boston Herald, November 23, 2001, p. 46.
6. For example, see ‘‘Fitch rates GMACM mortgage loan trust series 2001–J7,’’ Fitch press
release, November, 29, 2001.
7. For example, the October 31, 2001, press release, ‘‘NextCard retains Goldman Sachs to
pursue sale of the company’’ from NextCard reads, in part, ‘‘the Company has further tightened its underwriting criteria to limit new account originations to FICO scores above 680 . . . ’’
Also, since the FICO score does not reference any of the prohibited categories enumerated by
Regulation B of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, which include (among other factors) race,
color, religion, national origin, sex, age, and marital status, granting credit explicitly by FICO
score defends issuers against accusations of discriminating on these factors.
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of the empirical literature is to establish where this balance is struck,
with several studies taking the straightforward approach of quantifying
the circumstances of those filing bankruptcy. Sullivan (1968), Stanley
and Girth (1971), and Sullivan and colleagues (1989) all find substantial medical debt owed by bankrupts, and presumably discharged in
bankruptcy, which indicates at least some amount of insurance benefit
to bankruptcy. The incidence of abuse is harder to pin down. Culhane
and White (1999) estimate much less repayment capacity among
filers, and by implication much less evidence of abusive filing, than
Barron and Staten (1997).
Another way to establish consumers’ use of bankruptcy is to fit a
model of the filing decision. Domowitz and Sartain (1999) fit a model
that embeds the choice between Chapters 7 and 13, and consistent with
the earlier studies, they find high medical expenses provoking bankruptcy. Among the circumstances they associate with choosing
Chapter 7 over Chapter 13 are low income, unemployment, and again
high medical expenses. Gross and Souleles (2002) address the time
series trend in aggregate bankruptcy filings, which was strongly upward from 1994 to 1998, and find by fitting a model predicting bankruptcy from household risk characteristics that credit-card holders were
1% more likely to file in 1997 than in 1995, controlling for household
risk. The implication is a simultaneous decrease in the perceived
downside from filing, where this downside could be embarrassment,
that is, ‘stigma,’ or reduced access to postbankruptcy credit.
Staten (1993) directly addresses the role of postbankruptcy credit
by documenting a significant fraction of recent filers with at least one
new credit relationship—16% by 1 year postpetition and 53% by
5 years—and arguing that consumer creditors suffer a coordination
problem. All creditors presumably want consumers to expect little
credit after Chapter 7, since their historical recovery rate in Chapter 7
is so low,8 but they may also view recent filers as attractive customers
and hence grant them credit. From this perspective, the upward trend
in filings results from the upward trend in subprime consumer lending.
Ausubel (1997) and Ellis (1998) also connect increasingly aggressive
subprime lending to the filing rate, but their argument is that the extra
loans simply increase the number of high-debt households that benefit
from filing.
III. Data Description

The data for this article are two large panel databases, which we call
the Bankruptcy Panel and the Geographic Panel, of condensed credit
reports. The panels are populated differently and provide somewhat
8. About one cent on the dollar (White 1987; Sullivan et al. 1989).
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different information. For this study, the Bankruptcy Panel is useful
for its large population of past filers, and the Geographic Panel is
useful for its higher frequency and information on state of residence
and on the exact month of bankruptcy-flag removal.
The Bankruptcy Panel, which was constructed specifically for the
study of postbankruptcy credit, tracks 64,353 consumers: 44,353 who
had Chapter 7 filings on their credit records as of 7/94 (the ‘‘filers’’)
and 20,000 who had no filings on their records then (the ‘‘contrast
group’’). The large number of filers and the time series of their credit
statistics are a great advantage over previous studies of bankruptcy.
Experian assembled the panel by first drawing a random sample of 1%
of all 7/94 credit reports, then from that group choosing all consumers
with reported Chapter 7 filings, and also 20,000 with no Chapter 7
filings. For each panelist, we have a FICO score and a condensed
credit file, known as a STAGG (STatistical AGGregate) file, every 3
months from 7/94 to 4/96 and also 9/97. Panelists had to survive to
9/97 to be included. We have the discharge month of each filing but
the petition month of only a few, so to be consistent, the tests in the
rest of the article refer exclusively to discharge months. The Bankruptcy Panel has filing information only on 7/94 and not on subsequent dates, so we cannot observe the exact month of its removal.
If we knew the date of adjudication of each filing and if credit
bureaus removed bankruptcy information exactly 10 years later, then
we would know each panelist’s removal date. But we have the discharge date, which is generally around 4 months postadjudication9 but
varies and, in any case, our data provider removes the information
slightly before the tenth-year requirement, as early as 9O years. Taking
these uncertainties into account, we assume simply that bankruptcy
flags are on credit reports at 9 years postdischarge and off by 10 years.
The earliest discharge date we observe on 7/94 is 11/84 and the last
observation date is 9/97, so we have some data up to 12 years 10 months
postdischarge. Since 11/84 is 116 months before 7/94, we assume
when we have to estimate which filers do or do not have bankruptcy
flags on 4/96 that the filers without flags are those with discharge dates
117 or more months before, that is, 7/86 or earlier.
A STAGG file is a consumer’s credit report aggregated across
creditors within credit categories such as bank cards, auto loans,
mortgages, and so on. The STAGG files of the Bankruptcy Panel
contain 354 variables for each date, indicating current and recent
credit usage and delinquency, as well as credit lines where applicable.
Examples include ‘‘Total [sum] outstanding balance on all open bank
card trades’’ and ‘‘Total number of bank card trades 120 or more days
delinquent or derogatory,’’ where a ‘‘trade’’ is a credit relationship and
9. See Bankruptcy basics.
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an ‘‘open trade’’ is an active credit relationship. The last observation
date of the Bankruptcy Panel, 9/97, predates the more recent practice
by some creditors of strategically withholding information on credit
limits and usage.10
The FICO score is a proprietary, scalar function of credit reports.
The Experian/Fair, Isaac Model User Guide describes it as predicting
credit performance over the next 24 months, calibrated so that creditworthiness increases with the score. In our sample, it is available for
about 90% of the observations, and when it is not, the missing-value
code almost always indicates that account activity in the past 6 months
has been insufficient to calculate a score. There is no direct interpretation of a score, beyond the increasing relation to creditworthiness; to
allow some interpretation of score changes, we calculate the percentile
of each score in the Bankruptcy Panel relative to the contemporaneous
scores of the 20,000 panelists in the contrast group. That is, we map
each score to its ‘‘FICO percentile,’’ which is the percent of scores in
the contrast group, on the same observation date, below that score.
The Geographic Panel provides monthly credit reports of 100,642
consumers from 3/97 to 3/00, 37 observations in all (519 have one or
more missing reports). Aside from the frequency, there are several
important differences from the Bankruptcy Panel. The data are generally more extensive; we have each panelist’s state of residence each
month, and bankruptcy information each month, which means we
observe exactly when the information disappears. The panel sample is
geographically stratified, oversampling underpopulated states. While
this results in few observations of past filers (there were 2,092 panelists with Chapter 7 flags as of 3/97), it boosts power for measuring
cross-state variation.
IV. Short-Run Effect of Information Removal

When a credit report loses the fact that a consumer previously filed for
bankruptcy, the effect on the consumers’ apparent creditworthiness is
intuitively positive. And as the creditworthiness indicated by the other
facts on the report increases, the effect intuitively grows. That is, the
news content of past defaults increases as the experience of current
creditors improves. We begin this section by establishing the existence
and the cross-sectional dynamics of the initial effect of flag removal on
FICO scores; then we follow the consumers for a year to gauge the
practical effect on credit access.
10. According to an Experian white paper, the credit bureau first noticed this shift in
reporting policy in November 1997, when a large national issuer stopped reporting credit
limit and high-balance information ‘‘due to concerns of competitors stealing accounts.’’
‘‘Issuers Holding Out On Credit Bureaus,’’ Volume 14, No. 11, Card News, June 16, 1999.
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Fig. 1.—FICO-percentile change over the yth postdischarge year

In the tests that follow, each filer in the Bankruptcy Panel provides
exactly one observation of a 1-year change in credit statistics. Because
the first four observations are quarterly, exactly one of the four dates is
within a month (rounded off to the nearest month) of y  1 years after a
filer’s discharge month for 1 year y. For example, the first observation
date 7/94 is within a month of 7 years postdischarge for those with
discharges in June, July, or August 1987; and the second through fourth
dates are not within a month of y years postdischarge for these filers, for
any y. Observations 5 through 8 are exactly 12 months after 1 through 4,
so for each filer, we observe the credit report at the beginning and end,
approximately, of that person’s yth post discharge year for exactly one y.
For convenience sake, these are referred to as the ends of the y  Brst and
yth postdischarge years, but the dating is understood to be approximate.
A. Bankruptcy and Credit Scores

Let FPc;y be the FICO percentile, as defined previously, for consumer c
at the end of his or her yth postdischarge year, so that yth-year change
is FPc; y  FPc; y1 . The empirical questions are whether this change is
abnormally large for y ¼ 10, compared to other values of y and whether
it increases with FPc; y1 . We address both questions at the same time
by first sorting consumers two ways, by y into year groups 2 through 11
and by FPc; y1 into initial-score-percentile ranges [0, 10) through [40,
50), taking means within each year/score-range pair.11 The results are
plotted as figure 1, which has initial score FPc; y1 on the horizontal
axis and the 1-year FICO-percentile change FPc; y  FPc; y1 on the
11. The small number of past filers with Sc; y1 above 50, i.e., FICO scores above the
contemporaneous median in the contrast group, are disregarded.
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vertical axis. Each line shows the score-percentile change as a function of the initial score percentile for a given postdischarge year.
The graph makes several points. First, FICO-percentile changes
generally decline as the initial FICO percentile increases; in other
words, FICO scores are mean-reverting. As Section V shows, that
holds for consumers in general, not just bankrupts. Second, there is a
small seventh-year effect that is stronger when the initial score is
lower. Finally, there is a strong tenth-year effect for the best initial
credits. FICO percentiles in the 40–50 range at 9 years improve by 19,
implying that these consumers move ahead of 19% of the nonfiler
population in apparent creditworthiness when their flags are removed.
This is far above the usual change for scores in this range, which
appears negative. The 10th-year effect decreases as FPc;9 decreases
and is imperceptible for 0  FPc;9 < 10.
The 10th-year effect suggests that the 10-year reporting limit on
bankruptcy information has a large effect on the perceived creditworthiness of borrowers, especially borrowers whose credit reports are
otherwise positive. The 7th-year effect, and its shape, is consistent
with the regulation of nonbankruptcy derogatory information. Over
this year, the last details of the filing (charge-offs, repossessions,
defaults, etc.) disappear, but the filing itself remains. This is good news
for those whose details were relatively bad but not for those whose
details were relatively good, so it fits that the 7th year boosts FICO
percentiles for those with low initial scores but not high ones.
We establish the statistical significance of these patterns by
regressing score changes on year dummies, along with a time trend,
within each initial-score interval. Let yc be the postdischarge year
observed for consumer c, and I7c and I10c be indicator variables for
yc ¼ 7 and yc ¼ 10, respectively. We fit the model
FPc; y  FPc; y1 ¼ b0 þ b1 yc þ b2 I7c þ b3 I10c þ e c
for each of the five ranges of FPc; y1 . The results, collected in table 1,
show a significantly positive 7th-year effect for all but the highest initial
scores, and a significantly positive 10th-year effect for all but the lowest
initial scores, thereby establishing the statistical significance of the results
in figure 1. Reporting restrictions on adverse information deliver an immediate boost to apparent creditworthiness, as represented by FICO
scores, especially that of the more-creditworthy past filers 10 years later.
To see how this affects the clearing of the credit market, we move the
analysis from scores to actual credit.
B. New Credit after Flag Removal
Does the effect of the flag-removal regulation on credit scores
translate to meaningful changes in access to unsecured credit? A
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TABLE 1

Seventh and Tenth-Year Effects in Credit-Score Percentiles

Ex-ante Score

Intercept

[0, 10)

5.56
<.01
3.85
<.01
1.56
<.01
1.57
.21
1.97
10.06

[10, 20)
[20, 30)
[30, 40)
[40, 50)

Time Trend

Seventh-Year
Effect

Tenth-Year
Effect

Number of
Observations

.12
<.01
.11
.16
.07
10.10
.15
4.49
.15
35.03

1.37
<.01
3.61
<.01
3.66
<.01
1.99
<.01
.66
52.79

.43
26.76
1.06
2.23
3.18
<.01
10.03
<.01
19.28
<.01

9,045
12,522
9,523
4,089
1,297

Note.—For each past filer c in the Bankruptcy Panel, we observe the change in the credit score from
the end of y  1 years postdischarge to the end of y years, for exactly one y. Let yc be the y for panelist
c, and let FPc; y be the percentile, relative to the simultaneous distribution of the FICO scores of
nonfilers in the Bankruptcy Panel, of c’s FICO score at the end of y years postdischarge. Panelists
are sorted by FPc; y1 into five ranges [0, 10), for Sc; y1 in [0, 10), also [10, 20), [20, 30), [30, 40), and
[40, 50). Each pair of rows in this table represents a regression of the form FPc; y  FPc; y1 ¼
b0 þ b1 yc þ b2 I7c þ b3 I10c þ ec , where I7c is a 1/0 indicator for yc ¼ 7, and I10c is a 1/0 indicator
for yc ¼ 10. So b0 is the intercept, b1 is the time trend, b2 is the abnormal change for yc ¼ 7 given the
time trend, referred to as the ‘‘Seventh-Year Effect,’’ and b3 is the analogous ‘‘Tenth-Year Effect.’’
Two-sided p-values, in percentage terms, are below the coefficients in italics.

straightforward way to find out is to fit a regression model similar to
that of table 1 with the dependent variable changed to a measure of
credit access. The credit reports offer many potential measures; we
focus on the broadest measures of bank-card access, the number and
aggregate credit limit of a consumer’s open bank cards.
The regression model is the same as in table 1, except that I7 is
dropped and I11, an indicator for the eleventh year, is added. We drop
I7 to focus on flag removal, and add I11 because there might be a lag
before the credit access that flag removal brings appears on credit
reports. For new credit to appear, an issuer must notice a consumer’s
score, mail that person the offer, receive the acceptance, and report back
to the credit bureau. Even if this process begins soon after the flag goes
down, sometime in the middle of the 10th year, it may not finish before
the end of that year, so the 10th-year effect could extend into an 11thyear effect. Filers are sorted by FPc; y1 into four ranges: [0, 16.67), or
low score, [16.67, 33.33), or medium score, [33.33, 50), or high score,
and no score, for those with missing values for FPc; y1.12 Of the panelists with y ¼ 10, 28.1% have a low score, 34.4% have a medium
score, 23.3% have a high score, 12.7% have no score, and 1.5% have
FPc;9  50 and therefore excluded. Results are in panels A (Number
of Open Cards) and B (Total Credit Limit of Open Cards) of table 2.
12. We partition [0, 50) three ways, rather than five, to reduce clutter in the graphs and
tables; and we include no score to address concerns that focusing on panelists with scores
somehow biases the tests.
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Tenth and Eleventh-Year Effects on the Number and Credit Limit of
Bank Cards

Ex-ante Score

Intercept

Tenth-Year
Effect

Eleventh-Year
Effect

Number of
Observations

.02
<.01
.003
19.01
.04
<.01
.07

.09
.51
.01
77.72
.27
<.01
.24

.11
9.28
.06
31.32
.45
<.01
.44

5,602

<.01

<.01

.15

52
<.01
38
.40
219
<.01
260
.01

54
60.18
40
81.29
1,066
<.01
1,796
.01

202
34.51
361
29.61
1,627
<.01
116
89.05

Time Trend

A. Number of cards:

No score
Low score
Medium score
High score

.04
2.68
.05
<.01
.06
<.01
.17
.59

18,498
16,048
3,631

B. Total limit on cards ($):

28
58.43
Low score
28
66.72
Medium score 406
<.01
High score
211
58.66

No score

5,602
18,498
16,048
3,631

Note.—For each past filer c in the Bankruptcy Panel, we observe the change in the credit score from
the end of y  1 years postdischarge to the end of y years, for exactly one y. Let yc be the y for panelist c,
and let FPc; y be the percentile, relative to the simultaneous distribution of the FICO scores of nonfilers
in the Bankruptcy Panel, of c’s FICO score at the end of y years postdischarge. Panelists are sorted by
FPc; y1 into four ranges: no score, for those with missing values for FPc; y1 ; low score, for those with
FPc; y1 in [0, 16.67); medium score, for those with FPc; y1 in [16.67, 33.33); and high score, for those
with FPc; y1 in [33.33, 50). Each pair of rows in this table represents a regression of the form
Dc ¼ b0 þ b1 yc þ b2 I10c þ b3 I11c þ ec , where Dc is the yc  1 to yc change in panelist c’s number of
bank cards (panel A) or aggregate credit limit on open bank cards (panel B, in dollars), I10c is a 1/0
indicator for yc ¼ 10, and I11c is a 1/0 indicator for yc ¼ 11. So b0 is the intercept, b1 is the time trend,
b2 is the abnormal change for yc ¼ 10 given the time trend, referred to as the ‘‘Tenth-Year Effect,’’
and b2 is the analogous ‘‘Eleventh-Year Effect.’’ Two-sided p-values, in percentage terms, are below the
coefficients in italics.

For the past filers in the high score and categories, the 10th-year
effect implies a substantial boost in credit access. In panel A, the point
estimates for both groups are around one extra card per four consumers
in the 10th year, and close to one per two consumers in the 11th.
Similarly, in panel B, credit limits rise by over $1,000 on average in the
10th year for both groups, and the medium score filers see a similar
increase in the 11th.13 There is little perceptible effect for filers with
low or missing scores. These results demonstrate that the apparent
increase in creditworthiness does affect actual allocation of credit.
Lenders appear to depend on the scores, or similar functions of credit
reports, and removing this information from reports affects their
13. A potential reason for the insignificant result for the high score panelists with y = 11 is
that there are only 60 such panelists.
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Fig. 2.—Change in number of open bank cards over yth postdischarge year

decisions. The average changes for each initial-score/discharge-year
combination are plotted as figures 2 (Number of Open Cards) and 3
(Total Credit Limit of Open Cards), where the postdischarge year is on
the horizontal axis, the credit-access change is on the vertical axis, and
there is one line for each initial-score range. Both graphs show little
change for low- and missing-score consumers in each year, whereas for
the higher-score consumers, there is a pronounced spike at year 10.
There is little perceptible trend around 6 years, which is consistent with
the repeat-discharge moratorium having little effect, though—owing to
the reasons outlined previously—the effect might be economically
significant but too diffused across postdischarge years to detect.
These results from the Bankruptcy Panel show significant new
credit access for the relatively more-creditworthy filers following the

Fig. 3.—Change in credit limit of open bank cards over yth postdischarge year ($)
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Fig. 4.—New bank cards in past 6 months, by months since flag removal
(Geographic Panel).

flag removal. They cannot show the arrival of this credit in much
detail, however, because the observations are quarterly and do not
directly show the flag removal. By contrast, the Geographic Panel is
monthly and does show the flag removal, so for panelists that lose
flags, we know exactly when they lose them and can track their credit
access over the months following. The cost of using the Geographic
Panel is that the population of filers losing flags is small, and the data
on credit limits are unreliable.
Our sample is all 134 panelists who lose Chapter 7 bankruptcy
flags in 8/97 through 9/98, months 6 through 19 of our sample.
This allows us to track their credit access from 5 months before to
18 months after the month they lose their flags, which we call month
0. We sort them by their month 1 FICO scores into three groups,
with cutoffs chosen to distribute the 134 panelists relatively evenly:
the lower group, with scores below 585 (48 panelists), the middle
group, with scores from 586 to 670 (45 panelists), and the upper
group, with scores above 670 (41 panelists). We also track all the
filers who do not lose their flags over the period (1,119 panelists), to
reflect general trends. For this contrast group, month 0 is 6/98.
The statistic tracked is ‘‘Total number of bank cards opened within
6 months of the profile date,’’ the broadest and highest-frequency
measure of recent bank-card acquisition; the result, with one line per
group, is plotted as figure 4.
What figure 4 adds to figure 2 is that the new bank cards arrive soon
after the regulatory event, arriving on reports in the second half of the
first postflag year. The new, above-trend credit starts appearing on
reports around 6 months post removal, and the 6-month measure
appears to start trailing off around 12 months.
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This section shows that the 10th-year withdrawal of bankruptcy
information from credit reports delivers an immediate boost in apparent creditworthiness for the filers with at least medium creditworthiness going into the year. It further shows that the boost
translates to significant new credit access for these filers over the
ensuing year. These results illustrate the efficacy of manipulating
consumer credit by regulating credit bureaus. By the same token, they
show that the filers received credit they would not have received under
full information, which begs the question of whether this credit is too
much. Excess credit implies excess household risk and delinquency,
eventually; the remainder of the article addresses this question of
whether this occurs by following filers’ scores and delinquency as far
into the postflag experience as the data allow.
V. Longer-Run Effect of Information Removal

The tests of tables 1 and 2 use the first eight observations of the
Bankruptcy Panel. What we can do to track filers further past flag
removal is follow them to the ninth observation, 17 months after the
eighth. Because the Geographic Panel has 37 consecutive monthly
observations and it reveals exactly the month that flags go down, we can
collect its panelists who lose flags in its second through thirteenth
months and track them to 24 months post flag. Because that panel also
provides state of residence, we can sort these filers into those who would
enjoy relatively higher and lower exemptions in a future default. Since
exemptions shift credit risk to creditors, filers in higher-exemption
states may exploit excess credit more aggressively and therefore exhibit
relatively higher risk and delinquency. The first set of tests addresses
FICO scores in the longer run and the second set addresses delinquency.
A.

Fico Scores in the Longer Run

The empirical question is what happens to the scores after their initial
rise. If the scoring algorithm makes efficient use of bankruptcy information, we would expect the ex-flag scores to return eventually to
their cum-flag levels, as newly arriving information makes up for the
information lost to the flag removal, if the consumers’ true creditworthiness remained constant. However, excess credit suggests a decline in true creditworthiness, so that the net effect of the regulation
may be that household risk is higher down the road than it was in the
first place. In this case, we should find ex-flag scores to be abnormally
low compared to cum-flag scores. To run a meaningful comparison we
must account for the mean reversion, apparent in figure 1, that is a
general feature of FICO scores.
Abusing slightly the notation of the previous section, let Fc; t
be the FICO score of consumer c on observation date t. The mean

Evidence from Postbankruptcy Consumers

TABLE 3

741

Longer-Run Scores and Delinquency in the Bankruptcy Panel

Dependent Variable

Intercept

Fc;7=94

LOSEFLAGc

Yc;7=94

101.31
<.01
76.34
<.01
102.26

.151
<.01
.113
<.01
.152

6.061
<.01
8.091

<.01

<.01

<.01

2.191
<.01
2.279

.005
<.01
.005

.059
17.02
.124

.471
<.01
.166

<.01

<.01

.17

.03

Number of
Observations

A. OLS regressions:

Fc;9=97  Fc;7=94
Fc;4=96  Fc;7=94
Fc;9=97  Fc;7=94

15,212
17,346
16,926

B. Probit models:

Dc;4=96
Dc;9=97

17,977
17,664

C. OLS regressions:

Tc;4=96
Tc;9=97
Bc;4=96
Bc;=97
Lc;4=96
Lc;9=97

8,903
1.06
8,252
7.52
747
27.12
2,270
.06
15,938
<.01
26,691
<.01

31.84
<.01
44.80
<.01
3.54
.02
7.17
<.01
31.65
<.01
52.22
<.01

4,956
.03
8,208
<.01
1,024
.01
1,887
<.01
1,501
.04
3,150
<.01

.826
<.01
.804
<.01
.795
<.01
.769
<.01
.815
<.01
.860
<.01

17,977
17,664
17,977
17,664
17,977
17,664

Note.—The tests use two subsets of the Bankruptcy Panel: the 20,000 panelists with no Chapter 7
flags on their 7/94 credit reports, the ‘‘no-flag’’ panelists, and the 2,888 panelists that have Chapter 7
flags on their 7/94 credit reports and discharge months between 11/84 and 7/86, the ‘‘lose-flag’’
panelists. The indicator variable LOSEFLAGc is 1 for the lose-flag panelists and 0 for the others, and
the FICO score of panelist c on date t is Fc;t . The indicator variable Dc;t is 1 if panelist c is 30 or more
days delinquent on an open trade on date t, and is otherwise 0. The variables Tc;t , Bc;t and Lc;t are the
total debt, bank-card debt , and bank-card credit limit, respectively, of panelist c on date t, in dollars.
Panel A reports ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions predicting score changes, where the first
regression uses only no-flag panelists and the next two use both no-flag and lose-flag panelists. Panel B
reports Probit models predicting delinquency, where a positive coefficient indicates that the probability
of future delinquency decreases as the explanatory variable increases. Both Probit models use both noflag and lose-flag panelists. Panel C reports OLS regressions predicting total debt, bank-card debt, and
bank-card credit limits, using the same panelists as panel B. For panels B and C, the column headed
Yc;7=94 reports the coefficient on the 7/94 value of the dependent variable. Two-sided p-values are
below the coefficients, in italics.

reversion is apparent if, using just the contrast group of nonfilers
in the Bankruptcy Panel, we regress the change of FICO scores
from the beginning to the end of the sample period, that is,
Fc;9=97  Fc;7=94 , on the initial score Fc;7=94 . This is the first regression in panel A of table 3. The coefficient on Fc;7=94 is significantly
negative, consistent with mean reversion. To avoid confusing this
predictable drift with the time series dynamics of interest, all the
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tests for FICO-score changes include the initial FICO as an additional regressor.
To establish the longer-run dynamics of FICO scores, we append
to the contrast group those filers who lost their flags by 4/96. As
explained in Section III, these are the filers with discharge months
between 11/84 and 7/86. The indicator variable LOSEFLAGc is 1 for
these 2,888 panelists and 0 for the 20,000 contrast-group panelists. We
run two regressions in which Fc;7=94 and LOSEFLAGc are the independent variables. In the first regression, the dependent variable is
Fc;4=96  Fc;7=94 , whereas in the second regression, it is Fc;9=97 
Fc;7=94 . The first regression measures the excess change to an early
date in the postflag experience, and the second regression measures
the excess change to a later date. From table 1, we expect a positive
loading on LOSEFLAG in the first regression, reflecting the initial
rise; the loading in the second regression shows the longer-run effect.
Results are in the second and third rows of table 3, panel A.
As expected, the excess FICO change of the flag-losing panelists to
4/96 is positive. But tracking them down the road another 17 months,
we find the opposite. Despite the intervening boost from the FCRA, the
9/97 scores of these panelists are significantly lower than their 7/94
scores predict. That is, the excess credit documented previously
appears to lead to a long-run net increase in credit risk. For a better
perspective on the timing of this reversal, we turn to the Geographic
Panel, where we can track the panelists who lose their flags between
4/97 and 3/98 from exactly the month the flags disappear to exactly
24 months later. The downside is that there are only 96 such panelists.
To these 96, we append, analogously to the preceding, all the nonfiler
panelists, defined as those panelists without bankruptcy flags as of
12/97. For the 96 panelists who lose flags, we define month 0 to be the
first month without a flag, and for the nonfiler panelists, we define
month 0 to be 1/98. We run five regressions that predict the change in
FICO scores 0, 6, 12, 18, and 24 months after the flag removal, with the
same explanatory variables from panel A of table 3: the cum-flag FICO
score from month 1, and the indicator LOSEFLAG for the flag-losing
filers. The results are in panel A of table 4.
We find that the loading on LOSEFLAG turns from significantly
positive in months 0 and 6 to significantly negative by month 18. The
24-month loading is also negative, but the confidence interval is wide.
Putting together these longer-run FICO score results, the boost in
apparent creditworthiness delivered by flag removal is seen to be short
lived, gone in a year and soon replaced by a score deficit. By this
measure, removal of bankruptcy information increases the credit risk
of the affected households.
While the credit-score reversal has direct implications for the
households’ ongoing access to credit, due to creditors’ extensive

Longer-Run Scores and Delinquency in the Geographic Panel

Dependent Variable

Intercept

Fc;1

LOSEFLAGc

Dc;1

Ec

Ec  LOSEFLAGc

Number of Observations

A. OLS regressions:

Fc;0  Fc;1
Fc;6  Fc;1
Fc;12  Fc;1
Fc;18  Fc;1
Fc;24  Fc;1

.015
<.01
.080
<.01
.134
<.01
.161
<.01
.160

9.72
<.01
8.25
2.20
5.92
17.32
9.92
4.03
5.86

<.01

<.01

26.49

.091
33.01
.218
.07
.163
.62
.016
79.10
.532

.004
<.01
.003
<.01
.003
<.01
.003
<.01
.003

.122
70.10
.312
29.37
.128
59.27
.062
78.72
.283

2.90
<.01
1.28
<.01
.91
<.01
.67
<.01
.38

<.01

<.01

10.48

<.01

1.295
<.01
1.828
<.01

.005
<.01
.005
<.01

.099
72.86
.438
11.32

2.32
<.01
1.16
<.01

10.05
<.01
54.83
<.01
90.89
<.01
108.84
<.01
107.46

88,428
86,742
85,669
85,107
84,754
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B. Probit:

Dc;0
Dc;6
Dc;12
Dc;18
Dc;24

88,428
86,742
85,669
85,107
84,754

C. Probit:

Dc;0

.354
50.03
.477
20.55

88,428
86,742
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Dc;6

.021
15.80
.01
49.30
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TABLE 4

(Continued )

Dependent Variable

Dc;12
Dc;18
Dc;24

Intercept

Fc;1

LOSEFLAGc

Dc;1

Ec

1.911
<.01
1.736
<.01
2.092
<.01

.005
<.01
.005
<.01
.005
<.01

.355
6.70
.006
97.77
.378
11.95

.84
<.01
.62
<.01
.45
<.01

.02
12.63
.02
4.62
.02
2.99

Ec  LOSEFLAGc

.397
20.52
.217
48.14
.629
4.69

Number of Observations

85,669
85,107
84,754

Note.—There are 96 panelists in the Geographic Panel who lose their Chapter 7 bankruptcy flags between 4/97 and 3/98. For panelist c of these 96, we set LOSEFLAGc to 1
and define month 0 to be the first month without the flag and Fc; n to be the FICO score n months after month 0, so that Fc;1 is the FICO score in the last month with the flag. Dc; n
is 1 if panelist c was 30 or more days delinquent on an open trade n months after month 0. Definitions are the same for all other panelists, except that, for them, month 0 is defined
as 1/98 and LOSEFLAGc is set to 0. For any panelist c, Ec is 1 if c resides in a state with exemptions at or above the median for state exemptions and is otherwise 0. Panel A
reports OLS regressions predicting score changes. Panels B and C report Probit models predicting delinquency, where a positive coefficient indicates that the probability of future
delinquency decreases as the explanatory variable increases. Two-sided p-values are below the coefficients, in italics.
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reliance on FICO scores, they do not completely settle the question of
whether the households actually become less truly creditworthy. This
is because FICO scores automatically decline when consumers accept
or inquire after credit.14 We need a more direct view of true credit risk,
which we get by predicting actual delinquency. This is the task of the
last group of tests.
B. Delinquency in the Longer Run

Is ex-flag delinquency more likely than cum-flag credit scores predict?
That is, using the full-information scores from before the flag removal,
what is the effect of the postremoval increase in credit on actual
delinquency? To find out, we predict whether a consumer is delinquent
on a post-flag-removal date, using three predictors: the cum-flag score,
the lagged value of the same measure of delinquency, and the indicator
for flag-losing filers. The empirical question is whether losing the flag
leads to greater delinquency down the road.
We say that consumer c is delinquent on date t if the consumer has
an open trade whose present status is 30 or more days delinquent. In
that case, the value of Dc;t is 1; otherwise it is 0. The prediction model
is a Probit, where the dependent variable is Dc;t and the explanatory
variables are the FICO score and the value of D as of the initial date
7/94 and the previous indicator LOSEFLAG. We fit this model for the
sample used in the regressions of table 3, panel A, and report the
results in table 3, panel B. The first model predicts delinquency as of
4/96, and the second model predicts delinquency as of 9/97, both
using 7/94 information. A positive loading means that the probability
of delinquency goes down as the variable goes up.
The initial FICO scores come in significantly positive, as expected.
Higher scores imply a lower probability of delinquency 21 and
38 months later. The lagged value of D is significantly negative, which
is also expected. There is no separate influence of LOSEFLAG as of
4/96, but by 9/97 it predicts extra delinquency. Controlling for a
consumer’s score and delinquency at 7/94, we find greater delinquency by 9/97 if this person’s bankruptcy information disappeared
by 4/96. That is, dropping the flag increases the longer-run incidence
of delinquency. Running the analogous test on the Geographic Panel,
reported in panel B of table 4, we find that, after 2 years, LOSEFLAG
relates to greater delinquency, with a p-value of 10.5%.
Panel B of tables 3 and 4 show a greater incidence of delinquency
among ex-flag consumers than cum-flag scores predict. The underlying
cause suggested by tables 1 and 2 is that flag removal allows consumers to take down more credit than cum-flag scores predict. We can
14. See, e.g., ‘‘Credit rater eases multiple-inquiries penalty,’’ Lexington Herald-Leader,
January 23, 1998.
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test for this effect in the Bankruptcy Panel with regressions predicting
ex-flag credit in 4/96 and 9/97 with the predictive variables from panel
B of table 3: the FICO score and the lagged dependent variable in 7/94,
and the indicator LOSEFLAG. The fitted value of LOSEFLAG shows
ex-flag credit net of the credit predicted by cum-flag credit and scores.
Three measures of credit are considered: total outstanding balance on
all open trades, total outstanding balance on all open bank-card trades,
and total credit limit on all open bank-card trades, denoted Tc;t , Bc;t ,
and Lc;t , respectively, for consumer c on date t. Results are in panel C
of table 3.
The predictive regressions show substantially more ex-flag borrowing than cum-flag scores and borrowing predict. Total borrowing is
$4,956 more in the short term, $8,208 more in the longer term, and
about a quarter of this extra borrowing is with bank cards.15 The extra
bank-card borrowing is about two-thirds of the extra bank-card limit.
So the excess probability that postflag consumers go delinquent
coincides with an accumulation of excess debt, consistent with the
latter causing the former.
The final test is for the influence of state exemptions. States with
higher exemptions allow consumers to keep more property from
creditors, so strategic consumers (in the sense of Fay et al. 2002) see
more benefit from delinquency if they live in these states. Sorting
consumers by their states’ exemptions, we should expect to see the
excess credit provoke relatively more delinquency among the highexemption filers. This would be consistent with the finding of Gropp,
Scholz, and White (1997) that car-loan interest rates are higher for
debtors in high-exemption states. Only the Geographic Panel indicates
state of residence, so we can test for this effect only in its small sample.
The first step is to classify states as high- and low-exemption. For
each state and the District of Columbia we add up the homestead
and nonhomestead exemptions, catalogued by Gropp et al. (1997),
using the federal exemption wherever it is higher. If consumer c
resides in a state at or above the median total exemption, the value
of Ec is set to one, and otherwise it is zero. We test whether the
effect of flag removal on future delinquency is stronger in the higherexemption states by starting with the Probit model of panel B of
table 4, and adding as additional explanatory variables both Ec and
the interaction LOSEFLAGc  Ec . The empirical question is whether
the interaction enters negatively, that is, whether it predicts delinquency. The results are in panel C of table 4.
15. If we run the same regression with bank-card borrowing replaced by the balance on
open car loans, the point estimates are $878 and $1,199 in excess borrowing as of 4/96 and
9/97, respectively; and if we replace it by the balance on open real-estate loans the excess
borrowing is $1,773 and $3,491 in 4/96 and 9/97, respectively. All are statistically significant at the 1% rejection level.
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The Probit model never finds LOSEFLAG to be significant by itself,
but the interaction with the exemption level enters negatively at the
latest date, 24 months post flag.16 While the sample is small and the
potential for interference from other cross-state effects cannot be ruled
out, this supports the strategic view of consumers’ use of credit in
which they impute their legal rights to keep value into their credit
usage.
VI. Summary and Conclusion

Federal law requires credit bureaus to stop reporting bankruptcies after
10 years. Past bankruptcies are useful, adverse information about
creditworthiness, and the unsecured consumer-credit market depends
on credit bureaus, so the law has the potential to alter the clearing of
this market significantly. In large panel databases of credit reports, we
find both a short-run and a longer-run effect. In the short run, we find
significant increases in FICO scores, bank cards, and their credit limits,
particularly those of the more creditworthy past filers, across the moment when bankruptcy information is removed. That is, the reporting
limit artificially boosts the apparent creditworthiness of past filers. In
the longer run, we find that the score increase dissipates in a year, and
by 18 months post removal, the scores are lower than the initial scores,
those calculated with the bankruptcy information, predict. We also find
that the debt and delinquency of the affected consumers are higher than
their initial debt and scores predict and the extra delinquency is greater
in states with higher property exemptions from creditors.
Thus, the removal of the flag leads to excessive credit, increasing
the eventual probability of default. This is concrete evidence that the
flag regulation has real economic effects. This is market efficiency in
reverse. Information limits matter because they distort market clearing, moving risk exposures away from their prevailing balance. This is
a logical effect of the bankruptcy-information limit, although it may
not be the only effect. The eventual removal of bankruptcy information may encourage filers in their early postfiling years to use their
credit carefully, to prepare for the moment when the past filing disappears from their files and leaves an otherwise attractive track record.
On the other hand, to the extent that financially distressed consumers
expect this boon years later, their incentives to file today are greater.
With so many Americans passing through personal bankruptcy, the
significance of balancing these effects correctly is large, making it a
promising area for future research.
16. Interestingly, the high-exemption indicator Ec is significantly negative at 18 and
24 months, implying that—bankruptcy issues aside—consumers in higher-exemption states
are generally more delinquent in the future, controlling for initial score and delinquency.
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